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The plutonium coming from dismantled warheads and that 
already stockpiled coming from spent fuel reprocessing have 
raised many concerns related to proliferation resistance, 
environmental safety and economy. The option of disposing of 
plutonium by fission has been discussed and many proposals for 
plutonium burning in a safe and economical manner have been put 
forward. The advantages of utilizing the pressurized water 
reactors (PWRs) for plutonium disposition are the well developed 
and reliable technology and their diffusion. The mixide-oxide 
(MOX) fuel form, that is used for plutonium recycling in power 
reactors, is well developed. Nevertheless, to eliminate the 
production of additional plutonium during irradiation, an 
improved design fuel was analysed, which replace the natural or 
depleted uranium with inert oxides. 
This type of fuel offers the potential for annihilation of the 
major portion of the plutonium: commercial PWRs operating in a 
once-through cycle scheme could burn more than 98% of the 
loaded Pu-239 and more than 73% of the overall initially loaded 
reactor-grade plutonium. The plutonium still left in the spent fuel 
was quality-poor and then offered a better proliferation resistance. 
Power peaking problems could be faced with the adoption of 
burnable absorbers: zirconium diboride coating in the form of 
integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) appeared particularly 
suitable. In spite of a reduction of the overall plutonium loaded 
mass by a factor 3.7, there was not evidence of an increase of the 
Minor Actinides radiotoxicity after a time period of about 25 
years. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, the problem of disposing of excess plutonium 
has become more and more a topical and critical issue. As a 
matter of fact, large amounts of plutonium coming from spent fuel 
reprocessing have been already stockpiled and over the next 
decade, under already ratified agreements, significant amounts of 
weapons-grade plutonium (about 100 metric tonnes) are expected 
to be recovered from nuclear weapons dismantlement. The 
plutonium surplus raises concerns about proliferation, diversion 
and environmental damage. It may be noted that the reactor-grade 
plutonium could also be used to make nuclear weapons; the higher 
levels of plutonium isotopes, Pu-240 and Pu-242, only limit the 
efficiency and the capacity of the material for weapons use. 
Therefore, in the present situation, an ever growing plutonium 
production appears to be no longer the goal and the already stored 
quantities, those continuously produced from operating reactors 
and those obtained from weapons dismantlement should be 
disposed satisfying at least four different goals: i) preclude reuse 
by the superpowers; ii) prevent environmental damage from 
plutonium contamination; iii) prevent proliferation from diversion 
to nonweapons states; iv) recover at least part of the economic 
efforts for plutonium production. In this framework, the option of 
annihilating plutonium by fission seems to be particularily 
suitable. 
Several different solutions for burning plutonium have been so 
far proposed and discussed from the viewpoint of safeguards, 
proliferation resistance, environmental safety, technological 
background, economy and time schedule (Buckner, 1992), 
(Buckner and Parks, 1992), (Newman, 1993), (Walter and 
Omberg, 1993), (Buckner and Biswas, 1995). The urgency in 
facing the plutonium disposition issue and the need to maintain 
the economic viability of the plutonium burning option suggest 
the utilisation of the already available and operating reactors: 
then, PWRs appear to be the main candidate for the incineration 
of plutonium. The fundamental advantage of the pressurized water 
reactor designs for plutonium disposition is that the technology is 
mature and has been demonstrated to be highly reliable as proven 
by performance trends over the last 30 yr. 
In order to avoid any further plutonium production during 
irradiation, a new improved design oxide-type fuel has been 
recently proposed (Cerrai and Lombardi, 1992), (Lombardi and 
Mazzola, 1994), (Akie et al., 1994), (Paratte and Chawla, 1995). 
The present work aims to study a current technology PWR 
partially fed with inert matrix fuel, analysing some core effect and 
cycle parameters with 3-D calculations. The performances of a 
plutonium burner PWR (Burner Reactor) were compared to those 
of a standard uranium loaded PWR (Reference Reactor). 
FUEL TECHNOLOGY 
The inert matrix fuel is based on the dispersion of PuO2 within 
a carrier matrix made of inert oxides. The matrix should have 
good chemical compatibility, suitable thermal conduc- tivity, low 
absorption cross section and good stability under irradiation. The 
candidates oxides would be: Al2O3, MgO, CaO, Al2MgO4, CeO2, 
ZrO2 and so forth. 
Three different solutions appears to be particularly interesting: 
(a) solid pellets composed by a mixture of Al2O3, MgO and ZrO2; 
(b) annular pellets made of stabilized zirconia; (c) solid or annular 
pellets made of spinel. The first solution would allow the spent 
fuel to achieve a stable rock-like form and not to be soluble into 
nitric acid (Akie et al., 1994), so that it could be buried in deep 
geological formations without need of vitrification or any other 
treatment; however, in-pile experience is not available so far. The 
second solution requires a hollow pellet in order to compensate 
the low thermal conductivity of the fuel matrix; in spite of some 
concerns about the Reactivity Initiated Accident, there is a 
positive experience on the behaviour of zirconium oxide under 
irradiation (Dastur et al., 1994). The third solution is being widely 
investigated in the frame of the research on actinides burning; the 
first irradiation experiments are under way but, to the Authors’ 
knowledge, no results or performance data have been published 
yet. 
In the frame of an agreement between ENEA and Polytechnic 
of Milan the first pellets have been manifactured based on 
solution (a). The fabrication of sim-pellets of compositions (b) 
and (c) is under way. During this preliminary tests, aiming at the 
assessment of the inert matrix, the plutonium oxide was simulated 
by cerium oxide. The fabrication route was the Gel Supported 
Precipitation process, which has the main advantage to be a wet 
process, thus avoiding the fines contamination during 
manipulation. Two options are being presently investigated, i.e.: i) 
sol-gel of a solid solution of cerium oxide and inert oxides and 
then sintering; ii) sol-gel of cerium oxide dispersed within inert 
matrix powders and consequent sintering. This latter option would 
allow a microsphere coating for enhancing fission gas retention. 
Figure 1 shows the SEM analysis of a sim-pellet fabricated 
following option ii). The achieved density was 90% of T.D., being 
the goal 95%; cerium oxide (white spots) inside the inert matrix 





Figure 1. SEM analysis of a sim-pellet. 
CORE AND ASSEMBLY CONFIGURATION 
Neutronic calculations were performed for a carrier matrix 
composed by only MgAl2O4, considering this material as 
representative of a class of materials with similar neutronic 
properties such as MgO, CaO, ZrO2, Al2O3. However, the 
identification of the matrix composition will depend on its 
thermo-mechanical characteristics and on its in-pile behaviour. 
The plutonium considered in this analysis is of reactor-grade 
type: the initial plutonium vector (Pu-239/Pu-240/Pu-241/Pu-242) 
was 58%/24%/13%/5%, which is typical for a commercial, 34000 
MWd/t irradiated, PWR spent fuel. The content of fissile 
plutonium was set equal to 0.294 g/cm3; this figure ensured the 
fissile plutonium content to be equivalent to the U-235 mass 
contained in the 3.2% enriched Reference Fuel. Such amount 
guarantees the UO2 rods inside the Burner Reactor assembly to 
achieve approximately the same burnup rate than those in the 
Reference Reactor (Lombardi and Mazzola, 1995b). 
A full loading of inert matrix fuel would be attractive because 
of the large amount of plutonium that could be burnt. 
Nevertheless, due to the different neutronic features of plutonium 
with respect to uranium, such a reactor would have a dynamic 
behaviour dissimilar from the standard PWRs one, especially as 
far as reactivity coefficients and delayed neutron fraction are 
concerned. This fact might affect the reactor controllability, 
implying the need of additional investments for plant 
modifications. Possible countermeasures are the insertion of 
depleted uranium or the utilization of a thorium matrix. In this 
latter case, the insertion of small amounts of depleted uranium 
might also be necessary in order to reduce the proliferation 
potential of the built-up U-233; however, an increased plutonium 
inventory might be needed in order to achieve the same burnup. 
In spite of a reduction of the loaded plutonium per batch, a 
partial loading solution does not present major problems 
concerning Doppler or void coefficients, being this concept close 
to the currently operating MOX-fuelled cores. In fact, previous 
work demonstrated that the reactivity coefficients for a partial 
loading solution were only slightly different from those of a 
standard PWR (Lombardi and Mazzola, 1995a), (Puill and 
Bergeron, 1995). 
The Reference Reactor for this analysis was an AP600 type, 
using 3.2% U-235 enriched fuel. This reactor is characterized by a 
lower power density than conventional PWRs. so that lower 
centre-line temperatures are achieved. The Burner Reactor was 
similar to the Reference Reactor, but in the fuel assembly, shown 
in Figure 2, 56 rods over a total of 264 (-21%) were replaced with 
inert matrix fuel pins. Fuel and Reactor main parameters are 










Table I: Fuel and reactor parameters 
 
Reactor power 2035 MWth 
No. of assemblies 156 
Assembly layout 17X17 
Assembly pitch 215.04 mm 
No. of rods per assembly 264 
Average linear heat rate 13.5 kW/m 
Pin pitch 12.598 mm 
Pellet diameter 8.2 mm 
Cladding outer diameter 8.356 mm 
Moderator average temperature 305 oC 
Due to the presence of a limited number of inert matrix fuel 
pins, both reactivity swings and reactivity coefficients were 
verified to be rather similar to those of the Reference Reactor 
(Lombardi and Mazzola, 1995a). 
RESULTS 
The CASMO-3 lattice program (Edenius and Forssen, 1992) 
was used to study the fuel assembly and to produce neutron 
parameters and cross sections for feeding the 3-D core simulator 
ABARTH (Facchini et al., 1995). 
Because of the almost complete absence of fertile materials, 
the power generated from the inert matrix fuel steeply decreased 
during the fuel life. This caused an irregular distribution of the 
power between inert matrix fuel pins and UO2 pins. Power peaks 
were evident in the inert fuel at Beginning Of Life (BOL) while, 
consequently, the power requirements from the UO2 rods 
increased at End Of Life (EOL). Figure 3 shows the evolution of 
the power generated (normalized to the average one) in the two 
rods having the peak values at BOL (inert fuel rod) and EOL 
(UO2 rod). Effective Full Power Days (EFPDs) were used to 
measure the irradiation time because of the different overall heavy 


































Figure 3.  Relative power generation vs. EFPD 
 
 
The normalized power went from 1.54 (BOL) to 0.47 (EOL) in 
the inert matrix fuel, while it varied from 0.86 to 1.18 in the 
uranium rods. Therefore, a high thermal stress would be produced 
in the inert fuel at BOL and in the standard fuel at EOL. The 
respect of thermal limits must be carefully verified in order to 
avoid concerns about fuel rod integrity, fission gas release and so 
forth. 
By running ABARTH, each fuel cycle up to the equilibrium 
one was simulated. As far as the fuel management is concerned, a 
3-batches out-in reloading strategy was adopted. 
Objectives of the fuel cycle in the Burner Reactor were: (a) 
obtain an equilibrium cycle length comparable to that of the 
Reference Reactor, thus allowing the standard UO2 rods in the 
Burner and Reference Reactor to reach the same burn-up rate; (b) 
keep the maximum linear heat rate as lower as possible; (c) 
achieve a high consumption rate of the plutonium loaded in the 
inert matrix fuel rods. 
The obtained equilibrium cycle length was 409 EFPDs for the 
Reference Reactor and 393 EFPDs for the Burner Reactor. The 
soluble boron concentration in the moderator was, respectively, 
945 and 1046 ppm of natural boron. 
Due to the high reactivity of the inert matrix fuel rods, the 
radial core peaking factor of the Burner Reactor resulted to be 
1.55, being that of the Reference Reactor 1.47; moreover, it 
moved from the centre of the core to the peripheral zone, where 
the fresh fuel assemblies were located, thus increasing the core 
leakage. 
Since ABARTH is able to get a detailed 3-D description of the 
core, it is worthwhile considering the maximum rod linear heat 
rate in the whole core along the equilibrium cycle. The core was 
then discretized in 13 axial cells and the linear heat rate of each 
fuel rod segment was evaluated. The maximum values for inert 
matrix and standard fuel are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 






















BR (unpoisoned) - Pu rod
BR (unpoisoned) - U rod
BR (IFBA poisoned) - Pu rod
BR (IFBA poisoned) - U rod
 
 
Figure 4.  Max. linear heat rate through equilibrium cycle 
 
 
The maximum values for the Burner Reactor were of 40 kW/m 
at BOC (inert matrix fuel) and 19 kW/m at End Of Cycle (UO2 
fuel). The corresponding figures for the Reference Reactor were 
25 and 18 kW/m. 
In order to dampen the peaking factors and then reduce the 
maximum rod linear heat rate, the utilization of burnable poisons 
(BPs) was considered, modifying accordingly the shuffling 
strategy. 
The analysed BPs were erbia (Er2O3), gadolinia (Gd2O3) and 
zirconium diboride coating in the form of integral fuel burnable 
absorber (IFBA). The study requirements were: i) reduce the 
peaking factors both inside the assembly and across the core; ii) 
achieve the complete consumption of the BPs within the EOC in 
order to avoid any reduction of the fuel cycle length for the same 
initial fissile material inventory; iii) lower, when possible, the 
soluble boron content of the core for improving the reactor 
dynamic and safety. 
Erbia did not appear to be a convenient solution in this 
particular case. When erbia was inserted only in the inert matrix 
fuel pins, a significant reduction of the rod peaking factors could 
be obtained only with high erbia loadings, because of its low 
absorption cross section; however, erbia was burnt very slowly 
through the fuel life, thus getting a penalty in the cycle length. On 
the other hand, the insertion of lower amounts of erbia in all of the 
rods did not dampen the power peaks across the assembly. 
On the contrary, gadolinia was very efficient at BOC but its 
consumption was too fast, thus restoring the power peaks at EOC. 
Too high gadolinia loadings were not allowable for reactor start-
up concerns. 
The best performing BP was IFBA. In the chosen 
configuration, a layer of 0.06 mm thickness containing 0.223 
g/cm3 of B-10 was smeared on the fuel pellet. With this 
composition, the maximum power peak of the inert matrix fuel 
was reduced from 1.55 (unpoisoned case) to 1.32, as shown in 
Figure 3. As far as the radial power distribution is concerned, the 
assembly peak went from 1.55 to 1.41 and moved back to the 
central region of the core, thus reducing the core leakage. The 
cycle length was 399 EFPDs, slightly increased with respect to the 
unpoisoned case due to the reduced leakage, and the soluble boron 
concentration was lowered to 283 ppm of natural boron (Figure 
5); let us outline the importance of this reduction for the reactor 
safety and operation. 
 
 

































Figure 5. Boron concentration through equilibrium cycle 
In spite of a slightly higher maximum linear heat rate at EOC 
in the uranium rods (21 kW/m against 19 kW/m for the 
unpoisoned case), the maximum value for the inert matrix fuel 
rods at BOC was reduced from 40 to 29 kW/m (see Figure 4). 
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION CAPABILITIES 
The plutonium isotopic balance in the inert matrix fuel is 
shown in Table II at BOL and EOL. 
 
 
Table II: Plutonium mass balance (wt%) at BOL and EOL 
 
 BOL EOL burnt 
Pu-239 58 1.06 98.17 
Pu-240 24 10.26 57.25 
Pu-241 13 6.17 52.56 
Pu-242 5 9.27  
fissile Pu 71 7.23 89.82 
fertile Pu 29 19.53 32.64 
total 100 26.76 73.24 
fiss./fert. Pu 2.45 0.37  
 
 
More than 98% of the loaded plutonium-239 was burnt at the 
end of the fuel life, while the burnt fraction of fissile plutonium 
was 89.8. Finally, 73.2% of the whole loaded plutonium mass was 
annihilated. 
The plutonium still present in the discharged fuel was quality-
poor, thus reducing its proliferation potential. In fact, the ratio of 
fissile over fertile plutonium isotopes was 2.45 at BOL and 0.37 at 
EOL. These low fissile plutonium fractions in the unloaded fuel 
should render the spent fuel not attractive for any attempt of 
plutonium recuperation. It is worthwhile remarking that the 
overall plutonium mass was reduced by a factor 3.7. 
It is also interesting to compare the previous figures with those 
typical for the Mixed OXides (MOX) fuel (Wiese, 1993). The 
overall plutonium mass still present in MOX unloaded fuel after 
the first recycle ranges between 60 and 70% of the loaded 
quantity, depending on the attained burnup, which means the 
plutonium burnt fraction be between 30 and 40%. The fraction of 
fissile isotopes is still dominant: in fact the fissile plutonium 
percentage goes from about 71% in the loaded MOX fuel to 
values in the range between 52 and 56% in the discharged one. 
These figures show the validity of the proposed solution both in 
terms of plutonium overall reduction and proliferation resistance. 
However, the MOX fuel technology is well developed, while the 
present solution must undergo a long technological assessment. 
RADIOTOXICITY ISSUES 
Notwithstanding the large reduction of the overall plutonium 
mass which might be achieved by using inert matrix fuel, the issue 
of radiotoxicity should also be assessed. In the case of plutonium, 
the reduction of its mass and the increased proliferation resistance 
are key requirements but, nevertheless, an increase in the overall 
radiotoxicity might be a serious drawback in the proposed option. 
An analysis was then performed to assess whether the option 
of burning plutonium within an inert matrix would produce any 
increase in the Minor Actinides (MAs) radiotoxicity. The 
calculation was performed by using the SAS2H module (Herman 
and Parks, 1991) of the SCALE integrated code system (SCALE 
4.1, 1992). 
The radiotoxicity of a mixture of different radionuclides was 




where, for each ith radionuclide, Ai(t) is the radioactivity at time t 
after irradiation and ALIi is the Annual Limit of Intake through 
ingestion for the public (ICRP-30, 1984). 
In order to have a reference figure, 1 t of 3.2% enriched 
uranium after irradiation for ~34400 MWd/tHM in the Reference 
Reactor was considered; the MAs contained in the spent fuel were 
labelled as mix a. In the plutonium burning option, the plutonium 
included in mix a was assumed to be recovered with 2% losses, 
fabricated as inert matrix fuel and irradiated in the Burner 
Reactor. The MAs contained in the inert matrix fuel after 
irradiation, together with those left in the 1 t of spent fuel after the 
plutonium recovery were indicated as mix b. In such a way it was 
possible to compare the MAs radiotoxicity in the case of the 
simple storage of the UO2 spent fuel (mix a) with respect to that of 
the option of plutonium reirradiation as inert matrix fuel (mix b). 
In Figure 6 the decay of MAs radiotoxicity versus the cooling 
time are shown for mix a and mix b. 
 
 



















Figure 6.  Radiotoxicity decay for mix a and mix b 
 
 
The MAs radiotoxicity of mix b was larger than that of mix a 
for a period of about 25 years, because of the larger initial 
contributions of americium and especially curium. The plu- 
tonium direct contribution was clearly reduced. After this period, 
the radiotoxicity of mix b fell below that of mix a. The difference 
was about 20% and was due to the lowered direct contribution of 
plutonium and to the reduced americium build-up. A further 
reduction of about 20% in the difference of radiotoxicity of the 
two mixtures is obtained when referring to the produced energy. 
As a matter of fact, in the Authors' opinion, such a low 
difference was probably not meaningful and it could be inside the 
uncertainties of the MAs cross sections. What is to be stressed is 
that the significant reduction of the plutonium overall mass and 
the increase of its proliferation resistance did not involve any 
increase in the MAs radiotoxicity with respect to the MAs 
radiotoxicity of the UO2 spent fuel. A significant reduction of 
MAs radiotoxicity is beyond the potentialities of this solution, 
which was addressed mainly to the plutonium issue. 
FINAL REMARKS 
The plutonium annihilation capabilities of a current technology 
PWR partially fed with inert matrix fuel was investigated. The 
inert matrix fuel was made of PuO2 dispersed within a carrier 
matrix composed by inert oxides. Standard UO2 rods and inert 
matrix fuel rods were inserted together in fuel assemblies which 
were uniformly loaded in the core. 
An important characteristic of this solution was the irregular 
distribution of the assembly power between inert matrix fuel pins 
and UO2 pins. Due to the fast decrease of the power generation 
inside the plutonium rods, power peaks were evident in the inert 
fuel at BOL while the power requirements from the standard fuel 
rods increased at EOL. The high reactivity of plutonium bearing 
fuel also caused peaking factors across the core. 
The addition of burnable poisons might be envisaged for 
dampening these two effects. In this particular configuration, the 
best performing burnable poison was IFBA, which allowed to face 
the two problems getting at the same time a significant reduction 
of the soluble boron content of the core. 
The inert matrix fuel showed very good plutonium annihilation 
capabilities: more than 98% of the loaded Pu-239 was burnt and 
73% of the total loaded reactor-grade plutonium was consumed, 
thus reducing the initially loaded plutonium mass by a factor 3.7. 
The residual plutonium was quality-poor and then unattractive for 
any attempt of recuperation for misuse. 
In spite of the large reduction of the plutonium mass, the MA 
radiotoxicity did not evidence any increase after some 25 years. 
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